---
title: "What STIR/SHAKEN Doesn't Tell You About Who's Calling"
description: "STIR/SHAKEN is a real improvement for phone call authentication. But it only answers one question: did this call originate from a legitimate carrier customer? It says nothing about whether the caller is a human or an agent, what the agent is authorized to do, or whether the communication is legitimate."
canonical: "https://getdial.ai/blog/what-stir-shaken-doesnt-tell-you"
last-updated: 2026-04-23
---

# What STIR/SHAKEN Doesn't Tell You About Who's Calling

> STIR/SHAKEN is a real improvement for phone call authentication. But it only answers one question: did this call originate from a legitimate carrier customer? It says nothing about whether the caller is a human or an agent, what the agent is authorized to do, or whether the communication is legitimate.

April 23, 2026 · Engineering · 5 min read

If you've worked with voice telephony in the last few years, you've encountered STIR/SHAKEN — the framework that assigns attestation grades to phone calls to combat spoofing:

- **A (Full attestation)**: The carrier knows the caller's identity and that they're authorized to use the calling number
- **B (Partial attestation)**: The carrier vouches for the call origin, but not that the number belongs to this caller
- **C (Gateway attestation)**: The call passed through; origin unverified

STIR/SHAKEN is a genuine improvement over the spoofed-caller-ID era. But it answers exactly one question: **did this call legitimately originate from the carrier network it claims?**

For AI agents, that question is necessary but not sufficient.

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## The identity gap

STIR/SHAKEN attestation tells you "this call came from Verizon" or "this call came from AT&T and the number checks out." What it doesn't tell you:

- Whether the caller is a human or an AI agent
- What organization the agent works for
- What the agent has been authorized to do
- Whether appropriate consent exists for this communication
- What the agent has told this contact in prior interactions

An AI agent with a Twilio number calling on behalf of a company gets the same STIR/SHAKEN treatment as a human employee using the same number. The attestation is at the carrier level, not the application level.

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## Why this matters

As AI agents make more calls, recipients need more information than carrier attestation provides. They need to know:

1. **Is this a human or an agent?** Under the EU AI Act Article 52 and emerging US legislation, there are disclosure requirements for AI-to-human interactions. Carrier attestation cannot fulfill these requirements because it doesn't capture entity type.

2. **Is the agent authorized?** A legitimate agent calling on behalf of a company should be able to prove that authorization cryptographically — not just rely on the company's carrier relationship.

3. **Is the consent in order?** TCPA requires express written consent for automated calls. That consent record should be verifiable by anyone who needs to audit the call — not stored in a proprietary database that only the calling company can access.

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## What application-level trust looks like

The right answer is a trust layer above the carrier layer. STIR/SHAKEN handles carrier attestation. ACES handles application-level attestation.

Every ACES-native call carries an **Agent Attestation Token (AAT)** — a signed, verifiable claim in the SIP/WebRTC signaling headers that establishes:

- The agent's ACN (cryptographic identity)
- The agent's authorization to communicate on behalf of its organization
- The consent status for this specific contact
- The entity type (agent, not human)

Any ACES-compliant receiving system can verify this token against the ACN registry in under 50ms. No STIR/SHAKEN grade can tell you what the AAT can.

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## The disclosure requirement

For calls from AI agents to humans, ACES enforces mandatory disclosure. When the agent's policy includes `"disclosure": "required"` (which it should, for any human-outward call), the first turn of any voice interaction must include a natural-language disclosure:

> "Hi, this is an AI assistant calling on behalf of Genway. I'm reaching out about your trial signup. Is now a good time?"

This is not advisory. It's enforced at the infrastructure layer before the call is connected. The compliance isn't in the agent's prompt — it's in the protocol.

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## The bottom line

STIR/SHAKEN is a carrier-level trust system for a carrier-level problem. It was the right thing to build in the robocall era.

The agentic era has different trust requirements. Recipients need to know entity type, authorization, and consent — not just carrier origin. Those requirements need an application-layer trust standard, because the carrier layer was never designed to carry that information.

The two layers are complementary. STIR/SHAKEN remains necessary. What's missing is the layer above it.
